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Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism and
the North Carolina Dental Case
Herbert Hovenkamp1
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal antitrust laws are concerned almost entirely with private restraints. The
Sherman Act's legislative history provides little evidence that Congress intended for antitrust to
ride herd on anticompetitive or badly designed state regulation. The question itself is
anachronistic, however. In 1890 and even in 1914 when the Clayton Act was passed the
prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause would have precluded the reach of federal
antitrust into internal state economic policy, to say nothing of the policy of local governments.
For their part, the states in the late nineteenth century were precluded from regulating conduct
that crossed a state line.2
Conflicts between federal antitrust law and state regulation did not frequently arise prior
to the Supreme Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,3 which expanded federal power to
reach conduct or transactions that "affected" interstate commerce. Following Wickard, the Court
held a few years later in Women's Sportswear Manufacturing that the Sherman Act reached a
completely intrastate cartel of garment stitchers when their product was later shipped across state
lines.4
During the era of "dual federalism" that prevailed in the 1930s and earlier, federal power
did not reach activity unless it encompassed more than a single state, and the states had power to
regulate only within their borders. One important exception permitting state extraterritorial
control was corporation law. Early in the twentieth century some states began to authorize their
corporations to do business outside the state and also to acquire equity interest in other
corporations, or corporate mergers.5 Already in 1904, however, the Supreme Court held that the
legality of an interstate corporate merger under state corporation law did not immunize the
transaction from the Sherman Act.6 While the merger in question was accomplished through a
New Jersey incorporation act that permitted holding companies, the railroads involved operated
between the Great Lakes and the West Coast, entirely outside of that state and quite far from it.
In condemning the merger under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court did not
question New Jersey's power to authorize an extraterritorial transaction in this fashion—
1

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, Univ. of Iowa College of Law.
E.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 557 (1886) (negative Commerce Clause
precluded state from price regulating even the intrastate portion of an interstate route).
3
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
4
United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
5
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at 56-66 (1991).
6
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345-346 (1904).
2
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however, in doing so it could not interfere with national competition policy over interstate
commerce: “It cannot be said that any state may give a corporation…authority to restrain
interstate…commerce against the will of…Congress.”7
Serious conflicts between state power to regulate internal markets and federal antitrust
emerged after the full implications of Wickard v. Filburn became obvious for areas that were
traditionally subject to state regulation. In the South-Eastern Underwriters case (1944) the
Supreme Court extended federal antitrust law to the business of insurance, a market that had
traditionally been regulated entirely by state law.8 That decision soon prompted federal
legislation, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which restored insurance regulation to the states and
granted a partial antitrust immunity.9 The Supreme Court first acknowledged the modern "state
action" antitrust exemption for state-sanctioned conduct in Parker v. Brown.10 The principal
difference between the Women's Sportswear case and Parker was that the cartel in the former
case was purely private, while the raisin cartel in Parker was initiated and managed by the state.
The South-Eastern Underwriters decision and subsequent passage of the McCarranFerguson Act serves as a good object lesson: If the Supreme Court does interpret statutory
federal antitrust policy in a way that diminishes state power, Congress can always intervene. It
did so again with the Local Government Antitrust Act,11 which responded to the Supreme Court's
liability-expanding Boulder decision by largely taking damages off the table.12
The expansion of federal commerce power naturally invited reconsideration of one of the
most central concerns of federalism: namely, the power of state governments to regulate their
own economies in the face of conflicting federal policies favoring competition.13 The resulting
antitrust principles were judge-made, although they at least purported to be inferred from
congressional intent:
First, it seems clear that Congress never intended to displace sovereign state regulation of
their own internal economies in any significant way, and most of the legislative history of federal
antitrust speaks of federal-state cooperation rather than preemption.14
Second, however, nothing prevents the federal antitrust laws from being applied to
private economic conduct within their reach, even under an affecting commerce test. Indeed,
Congress itself has spoken on this issue. While the language of the Sherman Act is very broad,
the original language of the substantive Clayton Act and FTC Act provisions was not, reaching
only restraints in the actual course of interstate commerce. That limitation reflected the dual

7

Id. at 346.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). On the traditional view, see Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183–84 (1868).
9
15 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1102; see 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶219 (4th
ed. 2013).
10
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11
1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶223d.
12
Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 n.2 (1982); Local Government Antitrust Act,
Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), 15 U.S.C. §§34-36. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶223c.
13
On concerns of federalism that arose in the wake of Wickard, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF
AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 at 294-298 (2015).
14
See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND.L.J. 375 (1983).
8
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federalism of the period in which the Clayton Act was passed.15 However, after the Wickard
principle was well established Congress amended Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act in 197516 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 198017 so as to reach restraints "in or
affecting" commerce. It chose not to amend Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, dealing with
price discrimination and tying.18
The "commerce" delimiter on federal authority is also very important for identifying the
proper scope of antitrust federalism. The federal antitrust laws are passed under the commerce
power, and they explicitly apply only to restraints that affect commerce.19 They were never
intended to be a device for ensuring good government. State and local governments might pass a
wide variety of very bad laws that do not implicate federal antitrust policy for the simple reason
that they have nothing to do with commerce. Further, the Tenth Amendment is designed to
prohibit federal encroachment on state regulatory prerogatives, and also acts as an important
break on federal legislation passed under the commerce power.20
The distinction between "private" conduct and the conduct of a sovereign state is critical
in the post-Wickard world. If a state is regulating within its territory and it is actually the state
that is doing the regulating, then the highly general language of the antitrust laws generally
requires federal antitrust tribunals to stand aside. Federal antitrust has no power to police bad
state regulation as such. It cannot require that state regulations pass a cost-benefit test that might
weed out some instances of badly designed regulation.21 But it can properly insist on a showing
that the conduct in question be that of the state, and not of a private entrepreneur.
The antitrust “state action” doctrine addresses this problem by trying to identify the line
between sovereign state conduct, which is largely immune from federal antitrust oversight, and
private conduct, which is not. After nearly forty years of litigation the Supreme Court adopted
the modern two-prong “Midcal” test,22 which after subsequent elaboration, states:
1. “Sovereign” conduct performed by the “state” itself is immune; and
2. “Private” conduct must be both (a) authorized by the state, and (b) any anticompetitive
consequences must be “actively supervised” by a government official.
These prongs have been further refined:
3. In between the extremes defined by numbers (1) and (2) is conduct by state-created
government subdivisions that are not “sovereign” under the United States Constitution
15

E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(applying E.C. Knight to strike down federal child labor provision). See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 13 at
278-299.
16
15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2).
17
94 Stat. 1159, 15 U.S.C. §18.
18
See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶265, 267.
19
See id., ¶ ¶260-262.
20
On the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal antitrust law, see id., ¶¶215-217.
21
Cf. Exec. Order No. 12291 (President Ronald Reagan), 46 FR 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). See Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013);
Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2014).
22
From Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), hereinafter “Midcal.” See
1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶221f.
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(although they may be under state law); for these, the challenged activity must be
“authorized” but it need not be “supervised;” and
4. The issue whether conduct is "private" or that of a state-created subdivision presents a
federal question; that is, a state legislature's designation of a private group as an "agency"
of the state does not necessarily make it so.23
The question in North Carolina Dental, which was decided by the Supreme Court in
February, 2015, was whether the conduct in question fell more closely to number (2), the Court’s
majority conclusion, or number (3), which was the conclusion of the dissent. Question (4) also
divided the majority from the dissenters.
This multi-stage, judge-made set of inquiries is intended to enable the federal courts to
walk the very thin and indistinct line that defines the relationship between the federal
government and the states in the making of competition and regulatory policy. In some cases
placing the line is easy. For example, the governor, legislators and judges are state employees
who exercise sovereign power. This is true even though the state legislature is composed of parttime members who also have their own businesses and whose decisions as legislators may be
affected and even biased.
An important brake here is that legislative action must generally be signed by the
Governor before it becomes law. Another is that the state's highest executive, legislative, and
judicial branches are multi-sectoral, facing competing pressures from diverse constituencies. A
third is that most of these officials are answerable to the electorate. To one degree or another all
of these three considerations also apply to the highest officials in municipal government. They
do not necessarily apply, however, to specialized state agencies that may represent producers in a
single market, be composed largely of interested decision-makers in that market, and often are
not directly accountable to either the electorate or higher reviewers.
As formulated, the state action doctrine is not concerned with geographic spillovers.
Insofar as antitrust state action is concerned, the courts generally do not care whether the state
itself experiences most of the harmful effects of anticompetitive decisions rather than exporting
them to other states. As a result, the doctrine authorizes federal antitrust policy to dig into local
and intrastate issues, even to the point of rescuing the state from its own improvident decisions.
The doctrine is less concerned with one state's power to impose anticompetitive harm on other
states, and more concerned with ensuring that each state's own processes are transparent and
actually reflect articulated state policy. The dissenters in North Carolina Dental did not pick up
on this point.
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL EXAMINERS CASE
A. The Decision
The North Carolina Dental Examiners case24 is the second time in two years that the
Supreme Court rejected a "state action" defense to an anticompetitive arrangement that had been
approved under state law and that very likely visited any competitive harm almost entirely on its
own residents. In Phoebe Putney the Court unanimously held that a state statute that permitted
23
24

See id., ¶¶224-227, which develops each of these factors.
N. C. State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 ( 2015), hereinafter “N.C. Dental.”
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two hospitals to merge did not authorize an anticompetitive merger to monopoly. As a result, it
did not immunize the transaction from an antitrust challenge.25
In both cases the problems that the Supreme Court identified are fixable by state
legislation, although the legislation would require greater transparency about the interests that
the state was protecting. The facts of both cases suggested—but the Court did not consider—
whether it should be relevant that the anticompetitive conduct in question was harmful mainly to
the state's own residents. If state-sanctioned anticompetitive conduct harms mainly that state's
own citizens should federal authorities be less concerned?
The dispute in the Dental Examiners case reduced to one question: To what extent can a
state simply designate a private group as a state “agency” for purposes of asserting state
sovereignty, permitting all decision-making to be made by the unsupervised power of the market
participants themselves, and without review by a superior and independent state official? The
result may amount to a naked cartel, harming its customers wherever they are located.
This question arose in the very first state action decision, Parker v. Brown, where the
raisin cartel in question had market power within the state but exported 90 percent of its product
to other states.26 In addition to the antitrust claim the Court also considered and rejected the
challenger's argument that the raisin cartel program unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce.27 A somewhat similar case, Goldfarb,28 involved the inadequately supervised fee
setting of a state bar, presumably providing legal services to clients both inside and outside the
state.29
In N.C. Dental, by contrast, it seems clear that most of the consumers injured by the
dental board's restrictions on teeth whitening were within the state.30 Indeed, to the extent the
dental board's rule limiting the provision of teeth-whitening services to licensed dentists caused
competitive harm, it would have encouraged North Carolina consumers to obtain their teeth
whitening outside of the state or look for means (such as self-treatment) that were either outside
the reach of the rule or else difficult to detect. The same thing was likely true in the Phoebe
Putney case, involving a rural hospital in central Georgia that very likely served mainly Georgia
residents.31
A divided (6-3) Supreme Court32 agreed with the Fourth Circuit and the Federal Trade
Commission that the state dental board's restriction violated the antitrust laws because it was not
25

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27
Id. at 359-361.
28
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
29
The district court observed that a significant number of purchasers of title insurance in Fairfax County,
Virginia, worked outside the state. See 355 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Va. 1973).
30
The Federal Trade Commission spoke of harm to "consumers in North Carolina," but did not quantify the
percentage in its opinion. See In re North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, 152 F.T.C. 75 (2011), fact finding
#158.
31
See the FTC's decision, 2013 WL 4627512 (Aug. 22, 2013) (limiting geographic market to a six county
area). While the Commission did not reference the Elzinga-Hogarty test for a geographic market, if applied 90
percent of patients would have had to come from this area; See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ROGER D. BLAIR, & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶550a3.
32
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by C.J. Roberts and Justices, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
26
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adequately supervised by a sufficiently independent state decision-maker. The regulatory board
in question was controlled by a majority actively engaged in the practice of dentistry. 33 A state
statute provided that this Board was "the agency of the State for the regulation of the practice of
dentistry,"34 and it had authority over licensing as well as power to discipline the unlawful
practice of dentistry.35 Nothing in the statute, however, identified teeth whitening as part of the
practice of dentistry.36 Under the Act, six of the Board's eight members must be actively
practicing dentists, and these members were elected by other licensed dentists practicing in North
Carolina. A seventh member was required to be a dental hygienist, and an eighth "consumer"
member was appointed by the Governor.37
Dentists in North Carolina began whitening teeth in the 1990s, earning substantial fees.
In the early 2000s, however, non-dentists entered into competition with them and charged lower
fees, some of them operating from facilities such as cosmetic salons or kiosks in shopping
malls.38 The Board received numerous complaints from dentist members. Most of these
complaints were about the lower fees, although some also complained of possible harm to
consumers.39 The Board began an investigation conducted by several dentist members of the
Board, but excluding the hygienist and consumer members. Beginning in 2005 the Board sent
out numerous cease-and-desist letters to non-dentists performing teeth-whitening services.40 At
that point the FTC filed its complaint, challenging the rule limiting teeth whitening to licensed
dentists and the use of the cease-and-desist letters. It concluded that the Board's conduct was a
trade restraint prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act and was not immunized by the "state
action" doctrine.41 The Fourth Circuit agreed.42
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's argument that because its members “were
invested by North Carolina with the power of the State,” its actions required neither
authorization nor supervision in order to be free of antitrust scrutiny. “Here, the Board did not
receive active supervision by the State when it interpreted the Act as addressing teeth whitening
and when it enforced that policy by issuing cease-and-desist letters to non-dentist teeth
whiteners."43 A grant of "state action" immunity applies only to "exercise[s] of the State's
sovereign power.”44 That status "requires more than a mere facade of state involvement.... "45
The Court then observed:
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to
delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for established ethical
33

Id. at 1107.
Id., quoting N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §90–22(b) (2013).
35
N. C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1107, citing Id., §90–40.1.
36
Id. at 1108.
37
Id.
38
See the Fourth Circuit's opinion, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C, 717 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.
2013).
39
N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1108.
40
Id.
41
152 F.T.C. 75 (2011).
42
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
43
135 S.Ct. at 1110.
44
Id., citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991).
45
135 S.Ct. at 1111, citing FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992); and referring Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
34
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standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even
for market participants to discern. Dual allegiances are not always apparent to an
actor. In consequence, active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate
their own markets free from antitrust accountability.....So it follows that,
under Parker and the Supremacy Clause, the States’ greater power to attain an
end does not include the lesser power to negate the congressional judgment
embodied in the Sherman Act through unsupervised delegations to active market
participants.
... Parker immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign
actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession,
result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.46
Speaking then of the immunity requirements of clear articulation (authorization) and
active supervision,47 the Court observed:
The first requirement—clear articulation—rarely will achieve that goal by itself,
for a policy may satisfy this test yet still be defined at so high a level of generality
as to leave open critical questions about how and to what extent the market should
be regulated.... Entities purporting to act under state authority might diverge from
the State’s considered definition of the public good. The resulting asymmetry
between a state policy and its implementation can invite private self-dealing. The
second Midcal requirement—active supervision—seeks to avoid this harm by
requiring the State to review and approve interstitial policies made by the entity
claiming immunity."48
Turning to the active supervision requirement, 49 the Court noted that municipalities were
exempted from it because "there is little or no danger" that they might be involved "in a private
price fixing arrangement."50 Rather, the principal danger from municipal regulation was that the
municipality might "seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more
overriding state goals."51 In addition, municipalities are "electorally accountable" entities, and
they exercise regulatory power "across different economic spheres, substantially reducing the
risk that they would pursue private interests while regulating any single field."52 In the case of
municipalities, the Omni case had gone one step further, rejecting subjective tests for
"corruption" that would have forced a "deconstruction of the governmental process" by engaging
in "ad hoc and ex post questions of their motives for making particular decisions."53
After examining its earlier decisions, the Court drew a "clear" lesson that "Midcal’s
active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parker immunity for any non-sovereign
entity—public or private—controlled by active market participants."54 As a result, the need for
active supervision by the state itself turns "not on the formal designation given by States to
46

Id. at 1111, citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶226; Einer Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 667, 672 (1991); and Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L. J. 486, 500 (1986).
47
From Midcal, supra note 22. See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶224-227.
48
N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1112 (emphasis added), referring to Midcal, supra note 22.
49
See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶223.
50
N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1112.
51
Id. at 1112, quoting Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
52
135 S.Ct. at 1113.
53
Id. at 1113, citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991).
54
Id. at 1113, referring to Midcal, supra note 22. See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶221f.
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regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue private interests in retraining
trade."55 Further, "State agencies controlled by active market participants, who possess singularly
strong private interests, pose the very risk of self-dealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was
created to address."56
The court then observed that the Court's statement in Hallie "that active state supervision
would also not be required" of state agencies was dicta, given that the defendant in that case was
"an electorally accountable municipality with general regulatory powers and no private price
fixing agenda." As a result, the municipality resembled a traditional state agency rather than
"specialized boards dominated by active market participants."57 As a result,
The similarities between agencies controlled by active market participants and
private trade associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given
a formal designation by the State, vested with a measure of government power,
and required to follow some procedural rules.58 Parker immunity does not derive
from nomenclature alone. When a State empowers a group of active market
participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the
need for supervision is manifest. The Court holds today that a state board on
which a controlling number of decision makers are active market participants in
the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision
requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.59
The Court then discussed and rejected the Board's argument that the prospect of treble
damages would discourage citizens from public participation on such boards. It noted, first, that
this particular case, brought by the FTC, was not such a situation, and provided no occasion to
address the separate question of citizen members' liability for damages. Further, the state could
always provide for defense and indemnification of such members.60
The Court also rejected the argument that the Board's decision in this case should be
treated as a type of "peer review," which is "essential to the provision of quality medical care,"
and that the specter of antitrust damages would act as a deterrent to such review. The Court
concluded that this argument is more properly addressed to the "legislative branch," apparently
referring to either Congress or the relevant state legislature.61
Finally, the Court observed that active supervision was lacking in this case. Teeth
whitening was not covered by the statutory provisions creating the Board and stating its duties
and powers. Further, in this case the Board had acted against putative offenders by means of
unilaterally sent "cease-and-desist letters threatening criminal liability, rather than any of the
powers ... that would invoke oversight by a politically accountable official."62 It did not mean to
55

135 S.Ct. at 1114.
Id., citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶227.
57
135 S.Ct. at 1114. Further, “[t]here is no doubt that the members of such associations often have economic
incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for
anticompetitive harm.” Id. at 1114, quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S.492, 500
(1988).
58
Citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39, as "rejecting 'purely formalistic' analysis."
59
N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1114, citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶227.
60
135 S.Ct. at 1115.
61
Id. at 1116, citing Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations
Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014).
62
135 S.Ct. at 1116.
56
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suggest that a more judicially involved process, such as a request for a preliminary injunction,
would have qualified as supervision unless judicial review in that context actually reached the
competitive merits of the requested action. Nevertheless, the Court also stated:
Active supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s
operations or micromanagement of its every decision. Rather, the question is
whether the State’s review mechanisms provide “realistic assurance” that a
nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct “promotes state policy, rather than
merely the party’s individual interests.”63
The Court then provided a list of requirements for qualifying active supervision. First,
the state supervisor "must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the
procedures followed to produce it."64 Further, the relevant supervisor "must have the power to
veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy," and the "mere
potential" for such supervision is inadequate.65 Finally, "the state supervisor may not itself be an
active market participant. In general, however, the adequacy of supervision otherwise will
depend on all the circumstances of a case."66
B. Dissent
Justice Alito's dissent found the majority's reasoning to be "based on a serious
misunderstanding" of the antitrust state action doctrine.67 For him, the Court took "the
unprecedented step of holding that Parker does not apply to the North Carolina Board because
the Board is not structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of approval."68
Justice Alito then stated categorically that "Under Parker, the Sherman Act...and the
Federal Trade Commission Act...do not apply to state agencies; the North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of the matter."69 Returning to this issue
later, he concluded that the state of North Carolina had had an "agency" in mind when it passed
the legislation creating the dental board.70 "As this regulatory regime demonstrates, North
Carolina’s Board of Dental Examiners is unmistakably a state agency created by the state
legislature to serve a prescribed regulatory purpose and to do so using the State’s power in
cooperation with other arms of state government."71
Justice Alito also observed that self-regulation of dentistry long antedated the Sherman
Act.72 Further, when the antitrust laws were originally passed the scope of the Commerce Power
was much narrower than it is today. "As a result, the Act did not pose a threat to traditional state
regulatory activity," which generally applied only within its own borders.73 Further, "In 1890, the
63

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1116, citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102-103 (1988).
65
135 S.Ct. at 1116, citing Patrick, Id; FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992).
66
135 S.Ct. at 1117.
67
Id. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
68
Id. at 1117.
69
Id. at 1117–1118.
70
Id. at 1118.
71
Id. at 1120.
72
Id. at 1118.
73
Id. For development of this proposition, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 13 at
296-298.
64
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regulation of the practice of medicine and dentistry was regarded as falling squarely within the
States’ sovereign police power."
Like the majority, he also parsed earlier decisions, finding instances such as Parker itself
that found immunity for purely private, self-interested conduct.74 While Midcal had required
active state supervision, the party claiming immunity in that case was a private trade association,
not a state agency.75 Justice Alito preferred to liken the dental agency in the present case to the
municipality in Hallie. He found it "puzzling" that the majority treated the dental Board "less
favorably than a municipality."76 Municipalities, he noted, are not sovereign, while agencies can
and do exercise sovereign state functions.
C. Analysis
All members of the Court, including the three dissenters, agreed with the lower tribunals
that active supervision was not present. The legal conclusions they drew were starkly different.
The majority believed that state authorization was "rarely" sufficient standing alone, that it must
usually be accompanied by supervision, and that supervision by a market participant never
suffices.77 Municipalities and agencies in which a controlling number of decision-makers are
either disinterested public officials or else persons other than active market participants may
qualify. By contrast, the dissenters believed that authorization was sufficient any time the
relevant actor had been designated by the state as an "agency," without regard to the interested
and active market participation of the agency's decision-makers.
On the exemption from the active supervision requirement given to municipalities, the
majority emphasized one set of points—namely, (i) that municipal decision-making is most
frequently made by disinterested public officials, (ii) that municipalities are "multi-sector," with
regulatory obligations in many areas, and (iii) that most of the state action issues pertain to
municipal decisions that are excessively parochial rather than blatant trade restraints such as
price-fixing or market exclusion.78 For the dissenters, the main significance was that
municipalities were non-sovereign institutions of local government, while agencies were created
in order to carry out state policy.79
On the nature of the likely restraints, the majority's observation that municipalities rarely
engage in naked price-fixing or exclusion but are more likely to regulate for parochial or
territorial reasons is generally justified by the case law. Typical municipally imposed restraints
are things like tying of electric service to waste pick-up, use of land use provisions to limit
providers, or limitations on ambulance or airport taxi access.80 By contrast, Parker, Midcal,
Goldfarb, and N.C. Dental all involved participant-created price or output control that would
have been per se unlawful at the time of those decisions. Further, while Justice Alito found it
puzzling that the majority should treat agencies less favorably than municipalities, in fact the test
that the majority created applied to both. Municipalities are entitled to regulate without
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independent state supervision because they act largely through elected government officials
accountable through the political process. Presumably, if they should cede this power to an
"agency" of active market participants—say, a taxicab commission composed of taxi owners—
they would also be subject to the supervision requirement under the majority's analysis.
To be sure, municipalities cover a limited territory while state agencies often operate state
wide, as the Board of Dental Examiners did. But that distinction has little relevance for purposes
of assessing sovereign power. The more important differences are that the municipality is "multisector," dealing with nearly the same range of regulatory issues that state government controls.
This is particularly true of larger "home rule" cities that typically have most of the regulatory
power of states, but limited to their own borders.81 In that setting the interests of one
entrepreneurial group are more likely to be offset by those of a different group. Single-sector
agencies, by contrast, typically have members whose interests are aligned—such as practicing
dentists, all of whom could profit from a teeth-whitening cartel. Further, municipalities have
their own internal political processes, and their decisions-makers are answerable to the
electorate.
Both sides also agreed that the Dental Board's actions in this case were an instance of
special interest agency "capture." They drew different conclusions from that premise as well. The
majority embraced and the dissent rejected a link between the state action doctrine and special
interest capture. Indeed, the dissent noted that in Parker v. Brown, the grandparent of state action
cases, the relevant decision-makers were all market producers.82
The dissent drew strong conclusions from the fact that regulation of dentistry was
traditionally an intrastate activity that the Sherman Act very likely could not have reached at the
time it was passed. That changed with the Supreme Court's Wickard case in 1942, which brought
such markets within the reach of federal law provided that they had a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce.83 What the dissent did not note is that the present case was brought under
§5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, because the FTC has no direct authority to enforce the
Sherman Act. At the time of Wickard and Parker, the FTC Act reached only activities "in
commerce," but thirty years later it was amended to embrace all matters "in or affecting
commerce," thus tracking the Wickard language.84 Congress clearly intended for the FTC Act to
reach intrastate activities that affect commerce.
One portion of the dissent's argument seems anachronistic. The dissenters dwelt at some
length on Parker, which immunized what amounted to a state-sanctioned raisin cartel without
assessing any kind of supervision by a disinterested state actor.85 For decades the Court struggled
with the meaning of this decision, at one time suggesting that it required "compulsion." 86 It did
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not develop the modern two-prong test requiring "clear articulation" and "active supervision"
(but not compulsion) until Midcal in 1980.87 Already in Goldfarb, however, the Court held that
minimum price schedules promulgated by the Virginia Bar Association were not immune, in part
because no independent agency—referring in this case to the Virginia Supreme Court—
supervised them.88 On this point Goldfarb and the dissent seem quite inconsistent, and the
dissent did not attempt to resolve the conflict. In any event, the current majority was certainly not
taking an "unprecedented step" as the dissent suggested.89
The dissenters’ position that once a state-created "agency" is found, state action immunity
for authorized conduct is automatic is hardly a foregone conclusion from the case law. The State
Bar Association in Goldfarb had been designated "a state agency by law" in a 1938 statute
creating an integrated state bar.90 The Ticor decision, which also involved state regulatory
agencies, is somewhat different. There the "rating bureaus" were simply private cartels of title
insurers, and the relevant state agencies rubber stamped their rate requests with little or no
review.91 It is unclear, however, why rubber stamping by the insurance agency is insufficient,
given that it is an agency with the authority to make its own unsupervised substantive decisions
in this market. If it exercises by rubber stamping, that would be all the law requires under the
dissenters' view.92 In Cantor, a state agency, the Michigan Public Service Commission, had
approved a privately owned electric utility's practice of providing "free" light bulbs to utility
customers, later challenged as a tying arrangement.93 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
disapproved the arrangement. In sum, the majority's approach was hardly "unprecedented," as
the dissent suggested.94 Rather, it was more responsive to the Court's long list of admittedly
fumbling and confusing precedents, while the dissent dwelt at length on Parker.
Fundamentally, the dispute between the majority and the dissent centered on the
questions of "how much federalism" vs. "how much national competition policy." For the
dissenters all the state need do is declare that a group of private actors is an "agency" and that is
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the end of the matter. Apparently, the state could simply create an agency of taxicab drivers,
authorize them to select several among their members as decision-makers, and then give them
the authority to fix taxicab prices, with no further oversight required. This fact did not appear to
trouble the dissenters because the state as sovereign is competent to deal with the matter itself.
On this point, the majority's view seems more realistic about legislative processes. For the
dissenters all that was required was the formality that the state designate the association as an
agency, perhaps decades prior to the challenged action, as was so in this case.95
The dissenters' observation that dentistry was traditionally self-regulated96 also seems
beside the point of the federalism issue, and perhaps even cuts the other way. The Commerce
Clause identifies the line between federal governmental and state governmental power, not the
line between federal governmental power and private conduct. Entrepreneurial self-regulation
implies a division of authority as between the government on one side and private enterprise on
the other. Indeed, to the extent that a tradition of self-regulation is relevant it suggests that the
states were not involved. This fact should create more room—rather than less—for an expansion
of federal power. While federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause is properly limited
by state governmental activity, it is not limited by things that are within Congressional reach and
in which the state does not play a part.
For considerations of federalism, the extraterritorial effect or lack of it seems to be much
more significant, although the point was ignored by both the majority and the dissent. Ironically,
the raisin cartel found to be immune in Parker makes a better case for non-immunity than the
dentists' cartel in North Carolina Dental. Under the program at issue in Parker ten producers of
an agricultural commodity could request that the Commissioner create a "prorate" Committee for
that product. The Committee was composed of several producers of the commodity, although the
Commission had discretion to add two distribution members, such as canners or other handlers.97
At that point the producer-dominated committee issued production allocation decisions, and all
growers in the covered area were required to comply. Most significantly, in Parker nearly all of
the raisins produced under the quotas were shipped outside of the state of California, making the
state's raisin growers an enormous beneficiary of the cartel while visiting the consumer harm
elsewhere.98 Whether the non-dominant "distribution" members of the Committee were injured
or benefitted would depend on their markup. Ordinarily intermediaries would suffer from an
upstream cartel in the distributed product unless they were compensated by affected producers.
By contrast, in North Carolina Dental it seems clear that most of those purchasing teethwhitening services in North Carolina are also residents of that state. Further, states have their
own regulatory provisions as well as their own antitrust laws. These can also be deployed against
the anticompetitive acts of state professional associations (whether or not they are denominated
"agencies") if the state legislatures or courts so choose.99
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The majority thought that an important use of federal antitrust policy is to force a layer of
transparency through more public control of the state's own governmental processes, quite aside
from any question about extraterritorial spillovers. The Court emphasized that:
Immunity for state agencies...requires more than a mere facade of state
involvement, for it is necessary in light of Parker 's rationale to ensure the States
accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and
control.100
Further, this concern about transparency is important even if the goal is to protect the
residents of a state from their state's own anticompetitive decisions. The Court spoke repeatedly
of unsupervised private conduct that deviated from the state's own interest, stating "Entities
purporting to act under state authority might diverge from the State’s considered definition of the
public good,"101 and that the federal antitrust concern is to identify when the private decisionmaker "is acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the
state."102 Interestingly, the dissenters did not push this point, even though all three (Justices
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) are strongly sympathetic with concerns of federalism and state selfdetermination.
The dissent also objected that the majority's identification of "capture" with control by
market participants was "crude," and that determining when capture has occurred is "no simple
task."103 That observation is certainly factually correct, and political history is filled with
instances in which even salaried government officials were captured by the entities that they
were supposed to be regulating.104 Perhaps the more pertinent question is whether disciplining
the decision-making of self-interested market participants is a worthwhile activity when other
decision- makers who are not market participants might act improperly as well.
The best answer is that even imperfect law can be better than no law at all. For example,
a policy of removing drunk drivers from the road is worthwhile, even though not every accident
is caused by a drunk. Self-interested market participants are highly likely to be compromised in
favor of their own industry and may even rationalize that their decisions are best for the public as
well. Salaried government officials may or may not be excessively beholden to the industries that
they are intended to regulate, but capture cannot simply be presumed, and the political process
with its checks and balances provides greater control. This is particularly true of multi-sector
government regulators, who face conflicting pressures from competing interest groups.
Finally, the dissent fretted that the rule adopted by the majority would increase the risk of
antitrust treble damages exposure to those who serve on state agencies. While that problem
seems manageable, it does have to be managed. Damages actions seem to be almost a foregone
conclusion. As the majority pointed out, the very objection launched by most dentists to nondentist teeth whitening, and which provoked the dental association's rule, was that the non-
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dentists were charging a lower price.105 This evidence not only creates an inference that higher
prices resulted, but also provides a yardstick for measuring the extent of the overcharge.
The most obvious way for state agency officials to avoid antitrust exposure is to ensure
that potentially anticompetitive decision-making be supervised by economically disinterested
government officials. Another is to ensure that majority control over potentially anticompetitive
professional decisions not be vested in market participants. A third is use of the antitrust
mechanisms themselves, including the rule of reason for most professional rules that are
reasonably intended to promote socially valuable practices, and the per se rule for the occasional
situation where a professional association oversteps, as occurred in this case.
It is worth noting that standard-setting is ubiquitous in the American economy and is
hardly limited to professional organizations. In most cases those setting standards have no
immunity, but have simply learned to live within antitrust parameters. The courts, for their part,
have learned to appreciate the competitive and other social values of collaborative setting of
standards. As a result most, although not all, of such practices survive antitrust scrutiny.106 Of
course, this risk may be acceptable for a market participant but not for a citizen who volunteers
as a public service.
Finally, the majority did not rule out the possibility of simple state court supervision by
judges, provided that the review extended to the substance and not merely the procedure. 107 The
Court approved a roughly similar process in Hoover, concluding that substantive review by the
state supreme court, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity as manager, eliminated the need for a
separate supervision requirement.108 By contrast, Goldfarb denied immunity after finding that the
state's supreme court did not supervise the bar's practices.109 This adjustment may require a
modification of state administrative procedure acts or collateral legislation so as to provide for
more substantive judicial review when a threat to competition is apparent. The court may then be
empowered to appoint one or more special masters or other experts to evaluate the proposed rule.
The majority concluded that the states could readily indemnify agency members. Of
course, indemnification does not remove treble damages but provides that those damages must
be paid by the state and its taxpayers rather than the designated citizen officials themselves. That
in itself, however, might be a good discipline against anticompetitive conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
How much can a state default on its sovereign obligations and continue to be called
sovereign? The standard that the Supreme Court has developed is actually not all that high. The
final decision must come from a government decision-maker with power to review and
disapprove, but largely under any standard that the state wishes to articulate. What the state
cannot do, however, is simply paste the label "sovereign" or "agency" on a purely private actor.
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Neither the North Carolina Dental majority or dissent expressed much concern about
whether the anticompetitive conduct in question was self-deterring, and thus more addressable
through the state's own political processes. The raisin cartel in Parker was an economically
rational act for the state of California, because the beneficiaries were within the state while
nearly all of the victims were elsewhere. Under Midcal a state could, if it wished, articulate a
policy of supporting cartels of products in which local producers were dominant in the market
but buyers were mainly outside. That policy would increase the state's wealth and might even
attain voter support as a revenue device. If the state adequately articulated that policy and final
decisions were made by a governmental official, that would be the end of the matter insofar as
antitrust is concerned. By contrast, assuming that the teeth-whitening cartel is harmful—and the
evidence strongly suggested that it was—the net harm in the Dental case was experienced mainly
by residents of North Carolina who purchased teeth-whitening services. As a general proposition
cartels are socially costly because the aggregate harm to purchasers exceeds the aggregate
benefit to cartel members.110
In that case North Carolina's failure to supervise was injuring its own economy, but why
shouldn't it have that right? The important qualifier is that the effects of the cartel must be
internalized, with both beneficiaries and the burdened located within the state. Under the twoprong test for the antitrust "state action" immunity this question of internalization is rarely
relevant. Federal antitrust law reaches almost everywhere, certainly to a highly commercial
profession such as dentistry, notwithstanding that most dentist-patient transactions are intrastate.
Further, the two-prong Midcal test for state action is well established and does not make the
location of antitrust harm relevant. The fact remains, however, that North Carolina Dental
presents a weaker case for federal intrusion than did Parker.
The Dental case reflects greater paternalism, protecting North Carolina citizens from
their own deficient governmental decisions. Indeed, the majority in the Dental case articulated
the supervision requirement as querying whether the practice "promotes state policy" rather than
the defendant's individual interests.111 This recalled the query in the Phoebe Putney case into
whether a non-sovereign actor has "an incentive to pursue [its] own self-interest under the guise
of implementing state policies."112 At the same time, however, the degree of paternalism is
relatively modest—no more than necessary to force the state to make its own policy more public
to its own citizens.
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